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Over the decades during which Sylvia Ostry has been actively engaged in promoting 
multilateral trade liberalization, that process has broadened from an exclusive focus on 
“the shallow integration of the postwar, Cold War era”—the reduction or elimination of 
trade barriers erected at national borders--to concern itself as well with “the deeper 
integration of the post- Cold War era of the 1990s and beyond”
1.  Encompassed in this 
wider scope are pressures to harmonize a wide variety of “domestic” policies that also 
affect international trade and investment, a process that has received increasing focus in 
Ostry’s recent work and which she has termed pressure for “system convergence”
2.  
 
This broadened focus was, in fact, an inevitable result of the success of earlier, more 
narrowly focused rounds of trade negotiations.  As both tariffs and non-tariff border 
barriers (NTBs) were reduced and, in some areas, eliminated entirely in successive trade 
rounds, differences among nations’ laws and regulations in such areas as intellectual 
property protection, environmental rules, labor standards, competition (antitrust) policy, 
and many others increasingly emerged as major factors limiting or distorting the flow of 
goods, services, and capital across national boundaries.  At the same time, this shift has 
made the process of international trade negotiations more complex and more difficult, 
impinging as it does on issues of policy traditionally regarded as domestic, and therefore 
belonging exclusively to the jurisdiction of national governments. 
 
Market Integration and Policy Autonomy 
 
The tension between the integration of markets across international boundaries and the 
preservation of policy autonomy (“national sovereignty”) at the level of the nation-state is 
hardly new.  In its modern incarnation, it was presciently, and succinctly, stated by 
Richard Cooper in 1968 in his classic book The Economics of Interdependence: “The 
central problem of international economic cooperation—and of this book—is how to keep 
the manifold benefits of extensive international economic commerce free of crippling 
restrictions while at the same time preserving the maximum degree of freedom for each 
nation to pursue its legitimate economic objectives”
3.  A number of developments in 
succeeding decades have escalated this tension, however.   
 
First and foremost, the increase in transnational economic integration has itself generated 
a growing demand for rules to govern international economic interactions, what John 
Jackson has called the “interface issue”
4, particularly as multinational corporations 
(MNCs) have increasingly played a dominant role in this globalization process.  
Somewhat independently, the rise and proliferation of non-governmental organizations 
communicating and operating across international boundaries (Sylvia Ostry has dubbed MvNW 
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them INGOs) has intensified such pressures, “pushing for a codification of international 
norms in a variety of issue areas”
5.  According to one estimate, the number of such 
entities increased over the last quarter of the twentieth century from about 2500 to some 
16,000
6. And, as one would expect in response to increased demand, the supply, or 
number, of international organizations and treaties that make international law has also 
expanded substantially. 
 
The tension between market integration and policy autonomy has also been sharpened, 
ironically, by the spread of democracy.  The number of countries where an authoritarian 
régime has given way to some form of democracy has grown steadily in recent decades 
and, although accelerated by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, this welcome 
development has been by no means confined to the countries of Eastern (now Central) 
Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU).  As a leading scholar of international law has 
noted, “Citizens of democracies are naturally reluctant to cede decisionmaking authority 
to unelected international bodies unless the benefits of doing so are crystal clear.”
7 And 
the desire of national governments to preserve policy autonomy is likely to hold greater 
moral sway with the international community at large when those governments are 
democratically elected. 
 
Finally, this tension has been given concrete and immediate reality in Western Europe, as 
the customs union established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 has evolved in the 
European Union (EU) and European Monetary Union (EMU) of today.
8  In fact, the 
autonomy and effectiveness of individual countries’ monetary and fiscal policies in 
targeting domestic goals had begun to erode with the progressive liberalization of 
international capital flows and deregulation of financial markets beginning in the 1970’s.  
But this de facto erosion of national economic sovereignty in the macroeconomic sphere 
took a dramatic leap into de jure reality during the final years of the twentieth century.  It 
was then that the member countries of the EMU formally gave up monetary 
independence entirely, as national currencies were replaced by the Euro and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) took over the formulation and execution of monetary policy from 
the central banks of member nations. 
 
Although in principle the member nations of the EMU retain some control over fiscal 
policy, their fiscal autonomy is severely constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact, 
adherence to which is one of the requirements for EMU membership.  The Pact requires 
member countries to limit government deficits to no more than 3 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP), except under exceptional circumstances, and imposes other 
limitations as well.
9   Although the draconian fine for violations provided for in the Pact 
has not so far actually been imposed on any member country, both Germany and Ireland 
have received formal reprimands for exceeding the 3% limit and France, Italy, and 
Portugal have been the subjects of somewhat softer “warnings”.  The fact that several 
members of the EMU, including the two largest, have failed to adhere to the Pact’s 
requirements has led to a lively debate within the EMU regarding whether its provisions 
should be made more flexible. 
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In the micro-economic sphere, it is the EU’s commitment to the creation of a “single 
market” that has stimulated the process of deep integration, in order to facilitate the free 
flow of goods, services, labor, and capital among member countries.  In principle, the 
commitment to subsidiarity 
10 enshrined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty should preserve 
considerable micro-economic policy independence for the member states.  And the 
repeated confirmation by the European Court of Justice of the principle of mutual 
recognition,
11 stating that compliance with the regulatory requirements of one member 
state will confer legitimacy in the other member states as well, has gone some way 
toward reconciling a measure of national regulatory independence with the goals of a 
single market. 
 
Adherence to the principles of subsidiarity and mutual recognition have not, however, 
eliminated ongoing wrangles between member governments and the EU bureaucracy 
regarding their application in particular situations.  In the sphere of taxation, national 
policy independence appears to have won out.  Early efforts to harmonize levels of value-
added taxes were effectively abandoned in the face of resistance by national governments 
with different views on taxation and government spending and differing degrees of 
dependence on such taxes for revenues.  And, as the Economist noted in the mid-1990s, 
not only do the shares of government in the GDP of member countries vary widely within 
the EU, but this range broadened rather than narrowing between 1980 and 1995.
12  
 
In the regulatory realm, by contrast, disputes between Brussels and one or another of the 
member states, particularly the larger ones, are ongoing.  The creation of economic rents 
through subsidies or other forms of state aid to particular firms or industries constitute 
one fertile arena for such arguments.  In 1996, for example, the European Commission 
forced the German state of Saxony to reduce its planned subsidy to a Volkswagen plant 
on the grounds that it did not fully comply with EU rules limiting such assistance.  More 
recently, the European Commission announced that it would investigate a substantial 
subsidy, committed jointly by the German federal government and the regional 
government of Saxony to BMW for a new car plant in Leipzig, on similar grounds.   
 
This move was only the latest of several that led the German Chancellor, Gerhard 
Schröder, to “attack Commission authorities for an alleged anti-German bias on issues 
such as new proposals on car sales, a new European-wide takeover code and the health of 
his country’s economy.”
13  Shortly after that complaint,  “the European Commission 
ordered Deutsche Post, the partially-privatized German postal group, to repay 572 million 
euros ($545 million) in public subsidies it said were wrongly used to undercut the prices 
of rivals in the parcel delivery market”
14.  
 
Tensions between the EU Commission and national authorities have also arisen from 
differences in regulatory philosophy, or even simply regulatory history, on a wide variety 
of issues.  These include areas as widely divergent as competition policy, corporate 
governance, employment protection, privacy rules, regulations governing the taxation and 
investment of pension funds, and prudential rules for financial institutions.  The scope for 
such conflicts is likely to increase, furthermore, as the drafting of a constitution for a 
larger and more integrated Europe proceeds toward its planned completion in 2004.  This 
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exercise, in the eyes of some observers, is likely to favor increased pressure for 
harmonization (that is, convergence) of laws and regulations of member states and 
reduced reliance on the principle of mutual recognition. As these pressures for steps akin 
to Federal preemption of state laws in the United States confront the reality of an 
increasingly diverse group of member countries in an expanded EU, more frequent 
conflicts between national governments and EU institutions are a likely outcome.  
 
Although such deep integration has not proceeded nearly so far at the global level, the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), completed in 1994, moved significantly 
beyond negotiating reductions in border barriers to trade.  At the insistence of a group of 
American MNCs, who took the leadership in forming a coalition with their counterparts 
in Europe and Japan, this round was brought to successful completion only by 
incorporating agreements on such matters as access to foreign markets for service 
providers, the protection of intellectual property (TRIPS) and national requirements 
pertaining to foreign direct investment (TRIMS).  The simultaneous creation of the 
World Trade Organization, with a filled-out organizational structure and a much-
strengthened mechanism for the settlement of disputes, offered a framework within which 
tensions similar to those experienced within the EU could be played out. 
 
As Ostry has noted, although the deeper integration agenda successfully pursued in the 
Uruguay Round largely reflected the economic concerns of MNCs, the issues that have 
more recently risen to prominence and are likely to be particularly difficult to negotiate in 
future rounds arise from advocacy by cross-border coalitions of INGOs “…linked less by 
a rule of reason than by a rule of morality or values”.
15  The most prominent of these 
conflicts involve pressures for and against incorporating such issues as environmental 
and labor standards into multilateral trade agreements.  Those who favor such inclusion 
do so in the name of eliminating policy-induced distortions of international trade and 
investment flows and deterring a competitive “race to the bottom” by nations attempting 
to stimulate exports and/or attract foreign investment by offering cost advantages based 
on low standards of protection for workers or the environment.   
 
Opponents argue, on the other hand, that efforts to harmonize such policies on a global 
basis would violate legitimate differences in national needs, preferences, and priorities as 
revealed through democratic processes.  Even more to the point, they note, is that using 
trade sanctions to punish countries found to have violated the standards incorporated into 
WTO-sponsored agreements is likely to be counter-productive.  The reasoning is that, 
because poverty is the major factor associated with low levels of labor and environmental 
protection, sanctions which slow the economic development of poor countries by 
blocking their exports are likely to perpetuate rather than alleviate the very situation the 
sanctions purport to address. 
 
Above and beyond the various arguments pro and con incorporating such harmonization 
of standards into trade agreements is the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
developing nations are vehemently opposed to any such broadening of WTO authority. 
They regard it simply as a vehicle for disguised protectionism on the part of rich 
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countries fearing competition from goods and services produced at lower cost in poorer 
nations.
16  Indeed, it was President Clinton’s surprise endorsement of labor standards 
enforced by some form of sanctions that many observers believe to have been the major 
cause of the collapse of the ill-fated Seattle Round even before it got underway.
17  
 
Although the member nations of the WTO recouped the Seattle débacle by agreeing, in 
November 2001, to an agenda for the Doha Round, planned to conclude in 2005, these 
standards issues will almost certainly cause further difficulties in the actual negotiations.  
And the persistent tensions, papered over in the agenda-setting discussions, between the 
provisions for the protection of intellectual property incorporated into the Uruguay 
Round agreements and the demand of developing nations for access to low-cost drugs to 
treat diseases wreaking havoc among their populations has already delayed agreement on  
this issue (with the United States the lone holdout) beyond the anticipated end-2002 
deadline.  
 
I have just described a number of developments that have exacerbated the tension 
between international economic integration and the desire for policy autonomy on the 
part of nation-states.  These include the increased demand for the codification of 
international norms arising from the expansion of economic transactions across 
international boundaries, the rising prominence of both MNCs and INGOs, the 
proliferation of international organizations and treaties that create international law, the 
spread of democracy giving enhanced legitimacy to national preferences and priorities, 
and the concrete examples of how these contradictory demands play out, at the regional 
level in the European Union and at the global level in the World Trade Organization.  
The question then arises, are there any analytical principles or concepts that can help 
bring order to these contradictions and alleviate the tensions inherent in them? 
 
Macro-Economic Aspects of the “Impossible Trinity” 
 
In The Economics of Interdependence, Richard Cooper posed the “impossible trinity” of 
open-economy macroeconomics: that a country cannot simultaneously maintain fixed 
exchange rates, an independent monetary policy, and unrestricted international capital 
flows, but must choose any two of the three and give up the third.  Some thirty years 
later, Dani Rodrick offered a parallel “trilemma” in the political sphere, asserting that 
international economic integration, the nation-state, and mass politics cannot coexist.  
Once again, he argues, we must choose any two of the three, where “mass politics” is 
defined as a situation in which democratically-controlled political institutions are 
responsive to a popular will expressed through the exercise of an unrestricted franchise 
combined with a high degree of political mobilization.
18  The tensions I have described in 
the preceding section can, in fact, be seen as examples of the pulling and hauling among 
these three mutually inconsistent goals.  
 
Rodrik himself resolves the trilemma by opting  (in the double sense of regarding it as 
both most likely and most desirable) for sacrificing the sovereignty of the nation-state in 
many areas in favor of a form of global federalism, with “. . .supranational promulgation 
of rules, regulations, and standards”.
19  But, as he freely admits, this prediction is nothing 
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more than a “bet” based on optimism and his own preferences. The question remains: 
what further light, if any, can the existing body of analysis and alternative models in the 
realm of political economy shed on a possible resolution of this conundrum? 
 
One possibility might be to extend the concept of an optimum currency area to 
encompass fiscal as well as monetary policy, thus creating an analytical construct for an 
optimum policy area or, more precisely if more awkwardly, an optimum macro-policy 
area, where macro-policies are defined as policies directed toward income stabilization 
and economic growth.  Such an extension indeed might seem logical, in light of the 
myriad practical problems that are likely to interfere with the effective application of 
monetary and fiscal policies for these purposes if their domains are different.
20
 
There is, of course, a rich literature focused on defining the characteristics of an optimum 
currency area, the geographical boundaries within which the welfare costs of giving up 
the independent use of monetary policy as a stabilization tool are low compared to the 
benefits of permanently eliminating the costs of exchange-rate variability and its 
associated risks.  The concept was introduced by Robert Mundell in the late 1960’s, in 
the course of the ongoing debate on the relative merits of fixed versus flexible exchange 
rates.  Mundell’s criterion was apparently simple: the optimum currency area must 
coincide with the area over which labor can move freely, out of regions with 
unemployment and into those experiencing inflationary pressure.
21  
 
One of the implications of this labor mobility criterion, as Mundell himself pointed out, is 
that the optimum currency area is likely to be small.  This point is reinforced by the fact 
that Mundell’s definition requires perfect labor mobility in the occupational as well as the 
geographical sense.  His optimum currency area, in other words, must be perfectly 
homogeneous; “it must, indeed, be coexstensive with the single-product region.”
22  But, 
as Mundell anticipated and others were quick to elaborate, the identification of a small, 
homogeneous region with the optimum currency area is fraught with contradictions.  For 
such a region will inevitably be extremely open, in the sense that the foreign trade sector 
represents a large part of its economy which, in consequence, will be heavily dependent 
on and sensitive to influences from the outside world.  In particular, as McKinnon has 
pointed out, the exchange-rate flexibility required for monetary independence implies 
loss of control over the domestic price level in a highly open economy, and is thus likely 
to undermine the liquidity value and the general acceptability of the domestic currency.
23
 
In the decades since Mundell and McKinnon wrote their seminal papers, scholarly 
analysis of the issues they addressed has moved well beyond the simple, static Keynesian 
and price-elasticities assumptions on which their models were based.
24  But none of these 
more sophisticated elaborations has, to my knowledge, resolved the basic conundrum 
posed by the Mundell-McKinnon paradox.
25  That is the fact that the small, homogeneous 
economy required by Mundell’s labor-mobility criterion is virtually certain also to be 
highly open, thus contradicting McKinnon’s point that only in a relatively closed or self-
sufficient economy is an independent monetary policy and the associated flexibility of the 
exchange rate likely to be compatible with domestic control over the price level.  Without 
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such control, experience has shown, confidence in and therefore acceptability of the 
domestic currency is likely to collapse. 
 
The kinds of problems confronted by a currency union that fails to meet one or another of 
these criteria is illustrated by the issues currently confronting the conduct of monetary 
policy in the EMU.  Stubbornly high unemployment in some of the larger member 
countries, particularly Germany, indicate the need for monetary ease, while inflationary 
pressure in others, such as Spain and Portugal, militate against it.  Such problems are 
predictable, given the low degree of labor mobility, both geographical and occupational, 
not only between but even within EMU member countries.  The EMU is clearly not an 
optimum currency area by the Mundell factor-mobility criterion.  The strong political 
commitment to maintaining and extending the EMU, together with the fact that it is 
already a fait accompli, make its breakup virtually unthinkable.  But the difficulties 
confronting the European central Bank (ECB) are not likely to attenuate without 
significant structural changes, including above all a substantial increase in labor mobility. 
 
If extending the concept of an optimum currency area to define the criteria for an 
optimum macro-policy area, encompassing fiscal as well as monetary policy, is to prove 
useful, it must be based on a currency-area definition free of the contradictions just 
outlined.  One starting point for such an alternative criterion is the proposition that the 
macroeconomic costs of being part of a larger currency area are proportional to the extent 
to which the optimal rate of inflation for the economy under consideration diverges from 
that for the rest of the currency area. 
 
This criterion can be clarified with the aid of a simple Phillips-curve analysis.
26  The 
optimum rate of inflation for an economic system is then determined by the point of 
tangency between the Phillips curve, representing the attainable combinations of 
unemployment and inflation determined by the structural characteristics of the economy, 
and the community indifference curve representing, in this case, the politically-
determined trade-off function between unemployment and inflation.  Deviations in the 
optimum rate of inflation between different economies can be caused either by 
differences in their Phillips curves or in their trade-off functions, or both. 
 
This point is illustrated graphically, for the two-region case, in Figure 1.
27  It is assumed 
here that deviations in optimum inflation rates are due to differences in the underlying 
Phillips curves; that the trade-off preferences of both regions can be represented by the 
same family of II curves.  (The case where the deviation is due to differences in the 
community preference curves could also be examined graphically, but any conclusion 
would require specific assumptions about the distribution of adjustment costs between the 
partner economies.)  Note, incidentally, that since both inflation and unemployment are 
presumed to represent costs in welfare terms, the curves of the trade-off map represent 
higher levels of economic welfare as they approach the origin, where unemployment and 
inflation are both zero. 












































Figure 1: Harmonizing Rates of Inflation: The Welfare Effects
 
 
In the special case where the adjustment burden is equalized, in the sense that both 
regions have the same unemployment rate after joining the common currency area, the 
common inflation rate can be found in Figure 1 by locating the point where the two 
regions’ Phillips curves intersect and then extending a perpendicular to the vertical axis 
on which the common rate of inflation is measured.  It is then clear that the cost of 
belonging to a common currency area is greater the greater is the initial (pre-currency 
merger) discrepancy between the optimum rates of inflation in the two regions.  When 
the optimum rates of inflation are p1 and p2, based on underlying Phillips curves P1 and 
P2, the constraint of a common inflation rate will reduce total welfare in each of the two 
regions from the level represented by I1 to that represented by I0.  If, however, the 
Phillips curve of one of the regions were represented by P´2, the comparable costs would 
be represented by the move from I1 to I´0, clearly a greater reduction in economic 
welfare. 
 
This conclusion is not confined to the specialized case of an equalized burden of 
adjustment.  Assume, on the contrary, that the rate of inflation in the common currency 
area settles at p1, implying that region 1 bears none of the adjustment cost, remaining on 
the same indifference curve as before.  Then the total adjustment burden borne by region 
2 will be greater, in the sense of moving to an indifference curve representing a lower 
level of economic welfare, when its relevant Phillips curve is represented by P´2 rather 
than P2.  Analogously, when it is region 1 that bears the full burden of adjustment, that 
burden will be greater when the common rate of inflation is p´2 than when it is p2.  
However the burden of adjustment is distributed, the total welfare loss involved in 
moving to the common rate of inflation implied by a common currency will be greater, 
ceteris paribus, the greater is the initial discrepancy between the optimum inflation rates 
in the two regions.
28  
  8MvNW 
Draft 1/23/03 
 
This simple analysis generates an alternative criterion for the delineation of an optimum 
policy area: the regions or countries comprising such an area should vary as little as 
possible in their optimum inflation rates.  For nations or regions with substantial 
differences in economic structure leading to substantial differences in the loci of 
attainable inflation-unemployment combinations represented by Phillips curves, or in the 
preferences that determine their subjective trade-offs between the two, the costs 
associated with the maintenance of a common monetary policy and severely constrained 
fiscal policies are likely to be high.
29
  
This conclusion, in turn, yields at least two alternative implications for policy.  On the 
one hand, it suggests that countries widely divergent in this respect should remain as 
separate policy areas.  On the other, if the decision to merge into a common macro-policy 
area has already been taken, efforts should be made to reduce the divergences among the 
optimum inflation rates of the member countries, by exerting pressures for either their 
indifference maps, their Phillips curves, or both to converge.   
 
As regards the preferences and priorities that constitute a community indifference map, 
one might anticipate that the very fact of membership in a larger “community” is likely to 
reduce these differences over time.  However, such convergence may not occur quickly 
enough to guarantee the political sustainability of the economic union. A concern that 
such convergence may not be proceeding sufficiently rapidly among substantial segments 
of the member countries’ populations is one way to interpret the efforts of the EU’s 
executive, legislative, and judicial bodies to reduce or eliminate what has come to be 
called the “democratic deficit”.  This term refers to the fact that quasi-governmental 
decisions are being made by unelected bodies whose accountability to the constituent 
electorates is very tenuous. 
 
The kinds of changes required to bring about convergence of member countries’ Phillips 
curves (or, more realistically, a three-dimensional version of Phillips curves incorporating 
rates of economic growth) are quite different.  Stated as succinctly as possible, the 
policies involved here are the provisions governing taxation, regulation, and the creation 
or reconfiguration of economic institutions that affect the structural characteristics of an 
economy.  It is such policies that, in the majority of cases, figure in the issues regarding 
deeper integration, at both the EU and the global levels, that were raised at the beginning 
of this article.  And it is to the more detailed discussion of such policies and the prospects 
for their convergence, that I now turn. 
 
Convergence of Structural Policies: Top Down or Bottom Up? 
 
The convergence of structural policies associated with deep integration can come about 
through two different routes, or through some combination of the two.  One is the “top 
down” application of “hard law” created by formal treaties and conventions signed 
between sovereign states and ratified by national legislatures.  The other is the “bottom 
up” creation of “soft law” either through guidelines, recommended practices, non-binding 
resolutions or other multilateral political documents that lack the force of the formal 
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agreements cited in the preceding sentence or through promulgation by private-sector 
organizations with a multilateral reach.Z
30  Examples of the first category of soft law 
include UN General Assembly resolutions, International Monetary Fund (IMF) codes and 
standards, or G-20 communiqués.  Examples of the second category include the 
requirements developed by the International Accounting Standards Board and the 
standards imposed by credit-rating agencies, stock exchanges, or the International 
Standards organization (ISO). 
 
For the nations of the European Union, the role of hard law promulgated at the 
supranational level has grown steadily in recent years.  As of 1995, one particularly 
knowledgeable observer estimated that “[I]n the economic sphere, less than 50 percent of 
existing regulations are now of national origin.  One instance of a supranational entity, 
the European Commission, has become the principal source of regulation . . .”
31 In light 
of the Commission’s activities since 1995, along with the rulings of the European Court 
of Justice, which has tended more often than not to uphold the rulings of the Commission 
in disputes with national authorities, the percentage of economic regulations originating 
at the supranational rather than the national level has almost certainly increased further 
since that year. 
 
At the global (or at least massively multilateral) level, the promulgation of hard law 
affecting policies and institutions traditionally regarded as “domestic” was stimulated in 
the mid-1990’s by the Uruguay Round’s creation of the WTO and the expansion of its 
scope to encompass such policy areas as TRIPS, TRIMS, and market access for services.  
But the regulatory areas affected by this 1994 Agreement have been relatively limited, 
and efforts to extend them have been thwarted so far by the strong opposition of many 
developing-country members of the WTO.  Similarly, efforts to promulgate a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) that, after ratification, would have been binding on the 
member countries of the OECD, that is, virtually all the industrialized countries, 
collapsed in the face of opposition by several member countries, particularly France, and 
the powerful adversarial tactics of a number of INGOs.     
  
Although expansion of supranational hard law in the economic sphere has been limited 
where large numbers of countries that are geographically dispersed, culturally divergent, 
and at widely varying levels of economic development are concerned, the growth of soft 
law has not been similarly constrained.  As Ostry points out, “[I]n the financial sector 
there are a number of intergovernmental institutions such as the venerable Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) created after World War I, the 1984 International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and, most recently, the International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) formed in 1995.”
32  
 
In Ostry’s view, however, the inability of governments and intergovernmental institutions 
to keep pace with the accelerating pace of global economic integration has produced a 
move toward self-regulation, not only in financial services but also in the new 
marketplace of electronic commerce.
33  Such self-regulation may occur through private-
public interactions such as that between the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), a private organization created in 2001, which is in the process of developing a 
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hotly-debated set of supranational standards for accounting practices, and the EU 
Commission, which has mandated the adoption of the IASB standards by all EU firms by 
2005.  Or it may occur through the pressures stemming from standards promulgated by 
purely private organizations whose multinational reach has a significant effect on 
international capital markets, such as credit rating agencies and stock exchanges. 
 
The received wisdom in most discussion of the pressures for system convergence as a 
result of deepening economic integration is that these pressures are making it increasingly 
difficult and costly for nations to resist moving toward the American (sometimes also 
called Anglo-Saxon) style of capitalism.  Certainly, this is the view popularized by 
Thomas Friedman in his description of the policies required by what he has termed the 
Golden Straightjacket.
34  As summarized by Rodrik, these policies are “tight money, 
small government, low taxes, flexible labor legislation, deregulation, privatization, and 
openness all around,”
35 for which the U.S. represents the gold standard.  Similarly, Ostry 
argues that “[A] confluence of unrelated events. . .are accelerating the global reach of 
investor capitalism and deepening the push for convergence to an ‘Anglo Saxon’ 
corporate governance model in which the stockholder is king”.
36  Or, as she puts it more 
colloquially in conversation, “convergence toward the American model, which is fluid, 
flexible, disposable”.   
 
Certainly the increasing globalization of private markets for goods, services, and capital 
has intensified pressures on countries to increase their competitiveness in international 
trade and to create a legal and regulatory climate attractive to foreign capital in both 
direct and portfolio forms.  But pressures to adhere to the sorts of policies described in 
the preceding paragraph have also been generated by such multilateral institutions as the 
IMF and the World Bank through their insistence that current or would-be borrowers 
adapt their policies to what has come to be called the “Washington consensus”.  This set 
of prescriptions essentially extends the requirements imposed by private capital markets, 
as described in the preceding paragraph, into the sphere of public borrowing and lending 
as well.   
 
Just in the last year or so, however, the lessons learned from recent currency crises, 
together with heavy pressure from INGOs, including embarrassing and sometimes 
paralyzing street demonstrations, are causing these organizations to begin to question the 
Washington consensus and rethink their criteria for credit-worthiness.  Similarly, while 
the GATT-WTO has in the past tended to focus on and promote issues and policies 
favored by American-style capitalism, the agenda for the new round of trade negotiations 
initiated at Doha late in 2001 reflects a commitment to make this the “development 
round”, that is, to bring to the fore and deal with matters of particular concern to 
developing nations. 
 
In a variety of non-financial areas, in contrast, it is the rules and standards of the 
European Union, rather than those of the United States, that are extending their reach in 
the global economy.  The most widely-noted instance of this dominance was Brussels’ 
refusal in 2000 to approve the GE-Honeywell merger.  This negative decision resulted in 
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the abandonment of the deal, even though both companies are U.S.-based and the 
American antitrust authorities had already given their approval. 
 
Much more widespread, though less-noticed, has been the impact of EU regulations 
affecting both the characteristics of goods and services that are internationally traded and 
the processes by which they are produced.  That is because, where protection of 
consumers or of the environment is involved, EU requirements are generally more 
stringent than those of the United States or of most other nations.  This stringency is 
grounded in the EU’s strong adherence to the precautionary principle which holds that, in 
cases where there is uncertainty regarding the possibility of harm, rules and standards 
should err on the side of caution. 
 
The EU has not always prevailed when specific applications of the precautionary 
principle have been submitted to the WTO’s dispute-settlement procedures, whose 
sanction is necessary for a provision to be incorporated into the formal body of 
supranational hard law.
37  But its record in creating what is in effect global soft law is 
more impressive.  The EU’s 15 nations together constitute the world’s second-largest 
market—the United States remains the largest—and non-EU companies that compete in 
the global marketplace, or hope to do so, are increasingly designing and manufacturing 
all their products to conform to EU requirements.  That is because customizing products 
to meet different rules and standards in different countries would vastly increase 
complexity and expense; uniformity requires the most rigorous regulations and standards 
to prevail.   
 
Thus it is that Fisher-Price toys, Carrier air conditioners, Toyota (as well as other 
makers’) cars and SUVs, and Procter and Gamble’s dishwasher detergents all have been, 
or soon will be, adapted to meet EU safety, environmental, and recycling rules.  And, as 
regulatory harmonization across the EU proceeds, more and more products, wherever 
they are made and wherever they are sold, will be de facto subject to the soft law thus 
created. The same is true of the processes involved in international commerce.  Over the 
past two years, for example, nearly 200 U.S. companies, producing a broad range of 
goods and services, have signed “voluntary” agreements to abide by EU privacy rules, 
which affect the transfer and use of online data about individuals and thus have an impact 
on virtually every firm that has workers, suppliers, or customers within its borders.
38   
 
Perhaps the greatest impact of such EU soft law is on farmers, primarily but not 
exclusively American, who make use of biotechnology in genetically modifying their 
crops.  Because of stringent EU restrictions and labeling requirements on genetically 
altered foods or ingredients, multinational food processors are increasingly refusing to 
buy them on the grounds that they are likely to cause marketing problems in Europe.  In 
June of 2002, the U.S. threatened to bring legal action in the WTO against the EU for its 
refusal to approve some genetically modified crops, despite the fact that they have been 
approved by EU scientists, allegedly because of political sensitivity to European 
consumers’ concerns about their possible health and environmental risks (concerns that 
have led to such crops being labeled “frankenfoods” by those suspicious of their potential 
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The pressures for system convergence created by both hard and soft supranational law 
have tended to be toward U.S.-style capitalism in the realm of finance and corporate 
governance and toward EU-style regulatory stringency as regards product and process 
regulations.  In still other areas, the nature of the ultimate compromise is less clear.  As 
regards the soft law of global accounting standards, for example, a fierce struggle for the 
hearts and minds of the IASB is currently being waged between the “principles-based” 
approach that prevails in Europe and the “rules-based” philosophy that underlies 
American generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  Just how things will settle 
out by 2005, when all firms publicly-traded within the EU will be required to conform to 
IASB rules, is as yet unclear, although the recent rash of accounting-related scandals in 
the United States has certainly unseated GAAP from its gold-standard throne.  And on 
some issues, such as corporate governance, where  there is considerable pressure for and 
anecdotal evidence of convergence toward American shareholder-focused practices,
40 at 
least one econometric analysis suggests that convergence has been much greater in form 
than in substance or practice.
41
 
Two things seem clear from experience so far, however.  One is that the tension between 
deepening international economic integration and the desire for policy autonomy on the 
part of nation states will continue into the foreseeable future.  Another is that, although 
top-down hard law and bottom-up soft law will both play a role in the resolution of 
particular instances of that tension, the latter approach, because of its greater flexibility 
and more rapid adaptability, is likely to play the starring role. 
 
Conflicting Domains: Private versus Public Goods 
 
Once again, Cooper was the first to make a point that now seems obvious: that, for 
private markets in goods, services, and factors of production, the optimum currency—or 
macro-policy—area is the world.  The welfare justification for nation-states lies in the 
existence of public or collective goods and of differences in the consumption preferences 
for such goods among the citizens of different countries.
42  The principle of subsidiarity 
extends this logic to sub-national governmental units as well. 
 
Among the many public goods regarding which citizens express their preferences through 
the political process, and with whose provision governments at all levels are concerned, 
are such myriad determinants of satisfaction, or dissatisfaction, as national defense, 
income distribution, environmental quality, worker protection, level of physical 
infrastructure, and countless others.  One such public good that has played a significant 
role in trade disputes is culture.  When France imposed a discriminatory tax on foreign 
films or Canada refused to allow the Borders bookstore chain to open stores there, the 
rationale given for these barriers to trade and investment was the preservation of the 
national culture, as exemplified in films by French film-makers and books by Canadian 
authors, in the face of potential domination by carriers of a foreign (in these cases, 
American) one.  Even such a staunch defender of trade liberalization as Sylvia Ostry has 
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been heard to remark more than once, in this context, “only the Americans would fail to 
distinguish between culture and ball bearings or chickens”. 
 
Earlier in this discussion, I suggested that the gross welfare costs (not taking account of 
the benefits) of forming a common macro-policy area could be could be described in 
terms of the size of the pre-merger difference between two countries’, or regions’, 
optimum inflation rates.  This difference was shown graphically to result from 
differences between the countries’ structural trade-offs between unemployment and 
inflation, represented by Phillips curves, and-or the subjective combinations of the two 
preferred by their citizens, represented by community indifference maps.
43
Conceptually, this approach to measuring the costs of economic integration in the sphere 
of public goods can be extending to the arena of micro-economic policies as well, 
although mapping it would require as many dimensions as there are pairs of public goods 
that citizens care about and among which they have particular preferences.   
 
All this may be no more than an elaborate way of saying that economic integration 
between countries with very different needs, tastes, and priorities as represented through 
the political process are likely to find economic integration particularly difficult.  But it 
does help clarify why the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the first 
free-trade area to encompass countries at widely different levels of economic 
development, was regarded as a pioneering step into the unknown.  And it may also help 
explain why the accelerating process of deep integration popularly termed globalization, 
encompassing more and more countries widely divergent in their economic, political and 
cultural characteristics, has been accompanied by an intensifying backlash.  
 
Because human beings value both private and public goods, the tensions created by the 
divergent optimum policy domains they imply are certain to persist.  But these persistent 
tensions need not produce, as some have feared, a battle to the death between global 
economic integration and the nation-state.  Rather, one can imagine the two coexisting in 
a state of symbiosis: not a centralized world government but a networked form of 
international governance, fostered in part by private organizations and in part by 
functional parts of nation-states themselves.  As described by one legal scholar, “[T]hese 
parts—courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures—are networking 




Many of today’s most successful corporations exercise control over the resources 
required to produce private goods and services not simply through ownership but, 
increasingly, through the ability to coordinate and thus effectively utilize resources 
owned by others.
45  Similarly, nation-states may in the future find their effective 
sovereignty expanded rather than shrunk if they can manage a corresponding 
transformation in the provision of public goods, coordinating not only with other nation-
states but also with governmental bodies at both the sub-national and the supra-national 
levels, as well as with public-private and purely private entities performing regulatory 
functions, in order to achieve their goals. 
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